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I.

I NTRODUCTION

The Marcellus Shale play is a massive natural resources
development area and holds the promise of continued (if
fluctuating) growth and expansion. 1 The play covers parts of West
Virginia, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York, 2 and has created
opportunities and challenges from the beginning. Like all
economic growth, though, shale development has created
significant growing pains.
The recent shale boom in the United States occurred because
of the combination of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. 3
This evolution in oil and gas production has created challenges for
lawmakers and regulators, as well as oil and gas companies and
landowners, especially with regard to property rights. West
Virginia is the center of the Marcellus Shale play, 4 and the state
will be used to examine and assess some of these challenges.
This article will focus on key property challenges appearing
as part of the West Virginia Marcellus Shale play. The
introduction will give an explanation of the region that is the focus
of our analysis and explain the horizontal drilling process that is
an essential part of shale oil and gas development. The second
part of the article will provide an introduction to the concept of
severed estates, which can create separate ownership of the

1. See, e.g., Karen Boman, Study: Utica Shale Larger than Previous Estimates,
Rigzone.com, www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/139667/Study_Utica_Shale_Lar
ger_Than_Previous_Estimates (July 16, 2015) (stating “[t]he study results
indicate that the Utica—which spans West Virginia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania,
Ohio and New York—is comparable to the Marcellus Shale play in terms of
size and potential recoverable resources. The Marcellus is the large st U.S.
shale play and second largest shale oil and gas play in the world”).
2. Marcellus Shale Coalition, 10 Fast Facts About The Marcellus Shale,
http://marcelluscoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/MSC_Fast_Facts_
Large.pdf (last visited Mar. 30, 2015).
3. See Mary Tieman & Adam Vann, Cong. Research Serv., R41760,
Hydraulic Fracturing and Safe Drinking Water Act Issues 2 (2011), www.fas.
org/sgp/crs/misc/R41760.pdf (explaining that, according to the Independent
Petroleum Association of America, in excess of “90% of new natural gas wells
in the United States rely on hydraulic fracturing”).
4. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., Review of Emerging Resources: U.S.
Shale Gas and Shale Oil Plays, at app. A, p. 5 (2011), www.eia.gov/
analysis/studies/usshalegas/pdf/usshaleplays.pdf (mentioning that “the active
area [of the Marcellus Shale], defined using the acreage reportedly under lease
by the companies, is primarily located within West Virginia and
Pennsylvania.”).
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surface estate and the mineral estate. Then, the article will focus
on two keys issues. First, in part III, this article will discuss
whether horizontal drilling is a “reasonably necessary” use of
surface land to develop mineral rights. 5 And in part IV, this article
will discuss difficulties in analyzing deed language related to
minerals rights and royalty interests, which has created difficulty
for both owners and mineral leasing companies. Part V provides a
brief conclusion.

A. West Virginia and the Emergence of the Marcellus
Shale
Long before the lure of horizontal drilling and the Marcellus
Shale gas play, West Virginia was home to substantial natural
resource development throughout the fifty-five counties of West
Virginia. 6 As early as 1859, West Virginia had oil and gas
production. 7 The first known natural gas development was known
as “Burning Springs” and located near the Kanawha River. 8 The
community was named Burning Springs because natural gas in
the area routinely escaped from the ground and sometimes
burned. 9
Following the end of the Civil War, hundreds of conventional
(vertical) gas wells were drilled in West Virginia. 10 By 1906, West
Virginia’s natural gas production was greater than any state in
the nation. 11 By 1999, the oil and gas industry was still a
significant player in the state, employing more than 15,000
people. 12 As of 2002, the industry was still drilling several hundred
vertical shallow wells each year in West Virginia. 13 Following the
discovery that oil and gas could be extracted from the Marcellus

5. See generally, Lori A. Dawkins et al., Surface Use in the Age of
Horizontal Drilling: Will Horizontal Wells be Considered a “Reasonably
Necessary” Use of the Surface, 88 N.D. L. REV . 595 (2012) (discussing also a
surface owner’s possible arguments that horizontal drilling is not a reasonably
necessary use).
6. Joe Geiger, Burning Springs Oil Field, W. VA. HERITAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA,
www.wvencyclopedia.org/articles/726 (last revised Mar. 25, 2014).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Bernard L. Allen & David Matchen, Natural Gas and Petroleum, W.
VA. HERITAGE ENCYCLOPEDIA, www.wvencyclopedia.org/articles/1600 (last
revised May 10, 2012).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
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Shale, the oil and gas industry shifted its operation from vertical
drilling to horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. 14
Although the drilling methods and technology used in 1859
are of little comparison to today’s multi-million dollar horizontal
drilling and hydraulic fracturing operations, implicit in all mineral
development is the use of the surface. 15 Horizontal drilling
operations require not only “[b]igger-horsepower, higher-tech
rig[s]” but larger amounts of surface area to conduct the hydraulic
fracturing process. 16 As such, conflicts between mineral owners
and surface estates are almost inevitable. 17 Conflicts over surface
use occur more often in severed estates18 because the surface
owner is burdened by the development of the underlying minerals
even though the mineral owner reaps all (or nearly all) the
benefits. 19

B. The Horizontal Drilling Process
The Marcellus Shale is a low permeability rock formation that
contains massive amounts of natural gas. 20 Because the gas is
contained in very tiny pore spaces within the rock, the production
challenge is not discovering the gas, but recovering the gas from
the low permeability rock. 21 Traditional drilling of vertical wells
within the Marcellus could only target small pockets of gas and
produce small amounts of gas, which is uneconomical. 22 However,
through the use of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing,

14. Bob Williams, Unconventional Plays Transforming Scope, Shape of
U.S. Land Rig Fleet, THE AMERICAN O IL & G AS REPORTER (Apr. 2012), www.aogr
.com/magazine/cover-story/unconventional-plays-transforming-scope-shape-ofu.s.-land-rig-fleet.
15. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 596.
16. Williams, supra note 14. Once the fracking process is complete,
horizontal drilling can lead to reduced numbers of w ell pads, but the early
part of the extraction process requires more land than conventional drilling.
17. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 596.
18. JOSHUA P. FERSHEE , ENERGY LAW: A CONTEXT AND PRACTICE
CASEBOOK, 79 (2014). “Severed Estates: Land ownership initially (usually)
includes both the surface and minerals estate. If one separates the estate, for
example, by selling the surface rights but keeping the mineral right, the result
is a severed estate.” Id.
19. See Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 598 (stating, “[c]ourts have long
recognized that severed mineral rights lack value unless the mineral estate
owner can enter upon and use a portion of the surface to access and develop
the minerals.”).
20. See U.S. Energy Info. Admin., supra note 4, at 4–5.
21. FERSHEE , supra note 18, at 120–21.
22. Id.

2015]

Horizontal Drilling, Vertical Problems

417

production within the Marcellus Shale became economically
feasible. 23
The process begins with a production company drilling a
vertical pilot hole and then drill horizontally through the low
permeability rock. 24 Next, the producer applies a mixture of sand,
water, and chemicals at extremely high pressures to cause
fractures and fissures within the rock formation. 25 Then, the
fractures release large amounts of natural gas and stimulate
heightened production. 26 (This process is the same for shale oil
production.) Through the use of this technique, producers are
enabled to drill multiple wells from one drill pad to achieve a
greater production output. 27 In doing so, producers are forced to
construct substantially larger well pads than pads previously used
in conventional vertical drilling operations. Consequently, surface
owners who do not own the mineral rights beneath their property
can thus be forced to cope with large horizontal well pads being
operated on their property.
Even though horizontal drilling requires a larger well pad to
operate, it would take significantly more vertical wells to amount
to the production of one horizontal well. 28 For example, a 300-acre
surface owner would only have to endure one horizontal well pad
on her property, even though the same amount of production from
vertical wells on the property would take several wells to be drilled
throughout the acreage.
Nonetheless, many surface owners argue that horizontal
drilling operations unreasonably damage the surface and should
be regulated to favor the surface owner’s estate, and not the
mineral owner. 29 Along with pointing to problems of surface
disturbance, many surface owners are principally concerned with
the environmental effects of horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing. 30 Many surface owners are concerned that their water
supply will become contaminated and that fracking fluid chemicals
will migrate into their home. 31 Simply put, many surface owners

23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 597.
28. FERSHEE , supra note 18, at 121.
29. Why Multiple Horizontal Wells from Centralized Well Pads Should be
Used for the Marcellus Shale, West Virginia Surface Owner’s Rights
Organization (last updated June 24, 2015), www.wvsoro.org/resources/marcel
lus/horiz_drilling.html [hereinafter Multiple Horizontal Wells].
30. Id.
31. FERSHEE , supra note 18, at 122.
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hold a NIMBY and BANANA attitude towards horizontal drilling
operations. 32
1.

Mineral Owners, Mineral Rights, and Severed Estates

As with all oil and gas exploration, the surface above the
minerals must be used to facilitate the production process. 33 The
use of the surface is generally not (or should not be) as much of a
concern when the owner jointly possesses the surface and the
mineral rights (in fee simple) because the owner can (though they
do not always effectively) set the terms of use of his or her
property when issuing a lease to the production company. 34
The process becomes more of a challenge when there is a
severed estate. As within many areas of the Marcellus Shale, one
owner may own the surface of the land, while someone else owns
the minerals beneath. This situation can lead to problems for
horizontal drilling because of the large well pad operations that
are necessary for production to occur. 35 This is because the mineral
estate within a severed estate is the dominant estate and the
surface is the subservient estate. 36 This arrangement allows
mineral owners to possess an implied easement of surface usage to
develop their minerals, which means the surface owner with no
mineral rights has limited opportunities to object. 37 This implied
easement is not boundless, though, because mineral owners must
not create a substantial burden to the surface owner even where
surface use is “reasonably necessary” for production. 38
For traditional drilling, there were few limits placed on those
seeking to extract minerals. However, because horizontal drilling
has not been used on such a large scale until recently, there is (at

32. Absolute Banana, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 23, 1993), www.nytimes.com/
1993/12/23/opinion/l-absolute-banana-756593.html. “NIMBY” is an acronym
standing for “Not In My Backyard,” and “BANANA” is short for “Build
Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone (or Anything).” Id.
33. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 596.
34. Cf. id. (discussing conflicts between surface owners and mineral owners
that should not exist when the owner of each is the same); Karen Cox &
Joshua P. Fershee, Forced Pooling and Dispute Resolution, WVU Extension
Service Publications, http://anr.ext.wvu.edu/r/download/222182 (Nov. 2015)
(stating, “[t]hose who enter leases voluntarily should negotiate the protections
they want in their leases.”).
35. Id. at 597.
36. FERSHEE , supra note 18, at 79. “Dominant Estate: A parcel of real
property that has an easement over another estate (the servient estate).
Mineral rights, such as those to extract coal, oil, and gas, are generally
dominant to the surface estate, with an implied easement to reasonable use of
the surface and subsurface to access the minerals.” Id.
37. Id.
38. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 600.
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least) some question as to whether it meets the test as being
“reasonably necessary” for surface use. To completely understand
the rights of ownership within severed estates it is thus important
to discuss both expressed rights and implied rights.
The emphasis of this part is on surface use issues associated
with horizontal drilling, the development of the common law in
West Virginia, and the legislative measures regarding surface use.
Initially, a brief introduction of property rights is required to
understand mineral development as it pertains to surface use.
Next, the substantive rights of both mineral owners and surface
owners in severed estates will be examined. Afterward, a detailed
analysis of claims involving surface use will be examined to
highlight the courts’ stance in matters involving mineral
development and surface use. Finally, the focus will be on
legislative measures that have been enacted to provide surface
owners compensation for surface damages caused by the
development of minerals. The West Virginia legislature has passed
laws seeking to respond to the problems of mineral development in
the Marcellus Shale, 39 and an overview of these efforts follows in
the next section.

C. Express and Implied Rights
As one might guess, severed estates are generally formed by
one party reserving or conveying only the mineral estate. 40 These
reservations can be found in severance instruments. These
instruments usually come in the form of a lease, will, or deed. The
granting instrument can either provide a list of expressed rights to
the mineral owner or just have a broad general description of the
rights of mineral ownership. In some instances, expressed rights
will be absent from the granting instrument. In such cases, courts
have held that certain implied rights accompany mineral
ownership. 41 Implied rights will be discussed in further depth in
below.
A common problem affecting everyone from surface owners to
industry groups is that many severance instruments were written
more than one hundred years ago and do not contain any explicit
language granting the mineral owner the right to access the
surface. 42 For example, a typical deed reserving mineral rights

39. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-2 (West 2015).
40. FERSHEE , supra note 18, at 79.
41. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 598.
42. See Jason Proctor, Note, The Legality of Drilling Sideways: Horizontal
Drilling and Its Future in West Virginia, 115 W. VA. L. REV . 491, 499–500
(2012) (noting that “land owners in West Virginia began to separate surface
and mineral rights” and that the court later held that owners of mineral rights
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might state: “excepting and reserving to the grantor herein all
right and title to the oil and gas underlying said property.” Such a
reservation clause makes no reference to the mineral owner’s
ability to use the surface in developing minerals.
Further exacerbating the problem, instead of clarifying the
issue of surface use, many subsequent deeds will only reference
the prior reservation. An example of a chain title reference
contained in a deed might read as follows: “subject to any and all
exceptions, reservations, restrictions, easements, rights-of-way
and conditions as contained in prior deeds of record in the
Grantor’s chain of title.”
As these clauses show, neither of the deeds in the chain of
title contained an expressed grant for the mineral owner to have
access to the surface. This situation becomes even more
challenging with deeds executed decades ago because no one can
distinguish the exact intent of the parties at the time the deed was
executed. Ultimately, the court is left to interpret the rights of both
the mineral owner and the surface owner in such situations. 43 In
contrast to the simplification of usual reservation clauses, leases
prepared by oil and gas companies will typically contain an
expressed right of access. For companies, the right of access terms
in leases is intended to be all encompassing and cover all the ways
in which producers might want to use the surface. For example, an
oil and gas lease could contain a section that reads as follows:
Lessor, in consideration of Ten and No/100 Dollars and other good
and valuable consideration, receipt of which is hereby
acknowledged, and of the covenants and agreements of Lessee
hereinafter contained, does hereby grant, lease and let unto Lessee
the land covered hereby for the sole purpose and with the exclusive
right of exploring, drilling, mining and operating for, producing a nd
owning oil, gas, sulphur and other liquid or gaseous hydrocarbons
produced in association with oil or gas, together with the right to
make surveys on said land, lay pipe lines, [establish and utilize
facilities for the subsurface disposal of saltwater and other liquid
wastes produced from the leased premises,] construct roads and
bridges, build tanks, and other structures on said land reasonably
necessary for Lessee's operations in exploring, drilling for,
producing, treating, and transporting said minerals produced from
the land covered hereby[, and the non-exclusive right to conduct
seismic surveys thereon].44

can use the surface to access minerals under certain circumstances); see also
Phillips v. Fox, 458 S.E.2d 327, 332–34 (W. Va. 1995) (comparing situations
where deeds, written at times like 1904, do not provide for extraction of
minerals, with situations where deeds provide for extraction).
43. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 599.
44. Texas Oil and Gas Accountability Project, Sample Oil and Gas Lease
and Surface Use Agreement, 31, www.earthworksaction.org/files/publications/
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The above lease terms provide the gas producer an expressed
right of access to use the surface in developing minerals. A lease
like the one above could be executed by a property owner who
owns both mineral and surface or by a mineral owner of a severed
estate. 45 Recall that when only the mineral owner is involved, the
executed lease is only between the mineral owner and gas
producer, and it does not include the surface owner. 46 As such, the
surface owner is not involved in the initial lease agreement even
though the surface can be used by the gas producer following the
lease. 47 Accordingly, the mineral owner is giving to a gas company
or third party the right to access the surface owner’s property and
as well as the right to perform operations necessary to develop the
mineral estate. 48
This is the point where a court may become involved because
of a conflict involving a gas company’s use of the surface. 49
Ultimately, the signed lease agreement does not completely control
the company’s ability to utilize the surface. Instead, a court will
likely be required to analyze the implied rights granted to the
mineral estate at severance.
As described above, in many severance deeds there are simply
no expressed rights describing if and by what means a mineral
owner can use the surface. 50 As such, courts have been left to
interpret whether mineral owners have an implied easement to
use the surface to obtain their minerals. 51 This often happens after
a mineral owner has signed a lease with a gas company and
mineral development begins on the surface owner’s land. In
dealing with such disputes, West Virginia courts have generally
examined implied rights either under a multidimensional or a
unidimensional approach. 52 The two different approaches have
diverse methods of analysis and some courts impose a hybrid
approach.

Texas-Sample-Model-Gas-Lease_201106.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2016)
(brackets in original).
45. Proctor, supra note 42, at 499.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 503.
49. Id.
50. Cf. Coffindaffer v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 81 S.E. 966, 966 (W. Va. 1914).
51. See, e.g., Buffalo Min. Co. v. Martin, 165 W. Va. 10, 16 (1980) (stating
that where a severance deed contains broad, nonspecific rights for surface use,
“courts will be inclined to imply compatible surface uses”).
52. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 598.
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Multidimensional Approach

The multidimensional approach looks specifically at weighing
the benefits derived to the mineral owner against the damages to
the surface owner. 53 Many consider the multidimensional
approach to be a “due regard analysis” balancing benefits to the
mineral owner with the detriment to the surface owner. 54 Under
this approach, the cost of burdening the surface estate is weighed
directly against the benefit of developing the mineral owner’s
estate.
2.

Unidimensional Approach

The unidimensional approach focuses primarily on the
necessity and convenience of the mineral owner in developing
minerals. 55 The sole focus is on the mineral owner’s capability to
produce the underlying minerals by utilizing surface area. 56 Yet
the unidimensional approach does have limitations on what
operations a mineral owner can perform on the surface. Following
this approach, courts under the unidimensional approach have
limited the implied rights of mineral owners to actions that are
reasonably necessary for mineral development. 57 In attaching the
reasonably necessary limitation on surface use, judges (along with
juries) usually have to conduct evidentiary findings for specific
facts in each individual case.

D. The Dominant Estate Within a Severed Estate
As is the norm throughout the United States, West Virginia is
a state that allows property rights of a parcel of land to sever into
two separate and distinctive estates.58 Thus, a severed estate is
created with one person or entity having title to the surface, while
another person or entity owns some or all of the mineral rights
below. Because of the necessary operations involved in developing
minerals, the mineral owner often must be allowed access to the
surface. 59 Implicit in the assurance that a mineral owner can use
the surface to develop minerals is the concept that a mineral
estate is the dominant estate within a severed estate. 60 As a

53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 599.
57. Id.
58. W. Va. Code Ann. § 36-1-9 (West 2015).
59. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 596.
60. FERSHEE , supra note 18, at 79.

2015]

Horizontal Drilling, Vertical Problems

423

practical matter, this view of property rights within severed
estates is sensible. Simply put, if a mineral owner could not utilize
the surface to develop minerals, ownership of a mineral estate
would be valueless. 61 The principal governing that a mineral
estate is the dominant estate is accurately described in 1-3 Kuntz,
Law of Oil and Gas § 3.2, which states the following:
In states following the ownership theory, the severance of oil and
gas rights from the surface ownership creates a mineral estate
which is entirely separate and distinct from the general or surface
estate in the land. After such separate estates have been created,
the owner of the surface estate and the owner of the mineral estate
are not cotenants. Their relationship is more like that of adjoining
landowners, and there is no privity of estate between them, except
that privity which might exist by virtue of the mutually dominant
and servient nature of their respective estates. The mineral estate is
dominant in that the owner has the implied right of access, the right
to use so much of the surface and substances as may be necessary to
the enjoyment of the mineral estate. The surface estate is servient
in that it is correspondingly burdened.62

The United States Supreme Court has held that the mineral
estate is the dominant estate. 63 Although that case surrounded the
use of federal land, it involved issues of surface use and mineral
development. 64 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that a surface
owner could only continue to use the surface in manners that were
generally compatible with the mineral owner’s usage. 65 In doing
so, the Supreme Court made it clear that the mineral estate is the
dominant estate. 66 Because mineral development cannot be
accomplished without the mineral owner having access to the
surface, the Supreme Court reasoned that the mere existence of a
severed estate means that separate mineral ownership creates a
dominant estate. 67

61. Proctor, supra note 42, at 499.
62. 1 EUGENE K UNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF O IL AND G AS 3.2
(Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.) (Lexis Nexis 2015).
63. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 504 (1927).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
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II. REASONABLE NECESSITY IN HYDRAULIC FRACTURING
A. The Contemplation of the Parties Requirement as It
Pertains to Horizontal Drilling
1.

West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong

Looking into the West Virginia common law of what surface
uses are deemed to be reasonably necessary, it is important to note
that the courts give a great deal of deference to mineral owners,
even though there are certain activities that are strictly
prohibited. That is, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
is not inclined to find activities that completely destroy the surface
to be a reasonably necessary use. 68
A case illustrating this point is the Strong case. In Strong, the
court was forced to determine whether a coal company could
extract coal by means of strip mining, when the severance of the
subject mineral rights was executed before the technique of strip
mining was established. 69 The coal company argued that the
mineral owner was granted the right to strip mine because the
severance deed executed in 1904 granted the right to enter upon
the surface for purposes of excavating and removing coal. 70
However, the 1904 deed placed a duty on the mineral owner to pay
the surface owner $100 per acre for surface area that was used
and occupied during mining. 71 In dismissing the coal company’s
argument, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
reasoned that use and occupy does not equate to total
destruction. 72 For this reason, the court found that the parties did
not intend for the mining contemplated in the 1904 deed to include
strip mining or any other mining technique that completely
destroys the surface. 73 Some have argued that the Strong decision
is potentially germane to horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing; like strip mining, horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing are advanced technologies that did not exist at the time
many gas leases or mineral severances were executed. 74
Although no one can dispute that horizontal drilling
operations are indeed technological advances, it cannot be said
that such operations completely destroy the surface. The size of a

68. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46, 49 (W. Va.
1947).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 48.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 49.
73. Id.
74. Proctor, supra note 42, at 502-03.
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horizontal drilling well pad75 is of no comparison to the extensive
encompassing surface use of strip mining. 76 Additionally,
horizontal well pads are reclaimed in a manner that returns the
occupied surface area to a state that is substantially comparable to
how the surface was before the operations began. 77 However, like
Strong, where the court found that the parties in 1904 could not
have contemplated that the method of strip mining would be
implemented, one could argue that similar parties who severed
estates long ago did not contemplate the implementation of
horizontal drilling. Thus, the argument goes, like strip mining,
horizontal drilling operations should not be permitted on severed
estates held by dated leases. 78
A West Virginia Law Review article takes this exact position
by stating:
This “contemplation of the parties” requirement has an obvious
connection to horizontal drilling. In Strong, the mining company
wished to use the new technique of strip mining, a mining practice
that had not been conceived at the time the instrument granting the
mining rights was executed. The Court did not allow strip mining to
take place because the parties to the severance deed could not have
contemplated the technique or the burdens imposed by it at the time
of the deed’s execution. If the Court today were to apply this
principle, and nothing more, to the question of whether horizontal
drilling should be permitted under leases executed before the
technique became commonplace, it would have no choice but to ban
horizontal drilling under these circumstances.79

This, however, is not an accurate assessment of the intent
behind the contemplation of the parties’ principle. First, the
additional burden imposed by strip mining is not a similar burden
to the one imposed by horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing.
Such an analogy is a significant overstatement of the processes.
The total destruction of the surface caused by strip mining is not
an apt comparison to the substantial, but largely temporary,

75. Elizabeth McGowan, Fracking’s Environmental Footprint to Transform
Pennsylvania Landscape, Reuters (Apr. 25, 2011, 3:30 AM) www.reuters.com/
article/idUS308837987220110425 (stating that each horizontal well “drilling
pad covers a relatively reasonable 3.1 acres,” with an overall footprint of
approximately 8.8 acres).
76. Ken Ward Jr., Study Puts Strip-Mining Damage in Perspective, The
Charleston Gazette (Sept. 10, 2013), www.wvgazette.com/News/201309110198
(mentioning that “[a] one-year supply of coal would require converting about
310 square miles of the region's mountains into surface mines, according to
the study.”).
77. See generally, Jeff Skousen & Paul Ziemkiewicz, Reclamation of
Marcellus Shale Drilling Sites in West Virginia, West Virginia University,
http://anr.ext.wvu.edu/r/download/104190 (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
78. Proctor, supra note 42, at 503.
79. Id. at 502–03.
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surface disturbance of horizontal drilling operations. 80 Second, the
analysis implies that the difference between underground mining
and strip mining is analogous to the difference between vertical
drilling and horizontal drilling. 81 This analogy, too, fails because
the comparison between underground mining and strip mining
reveals that the first operation involves relatively modest surface
disturbance while strip mining is predicated on removing the
entire surface.
Vertical drilling and horizontal drilling both require surface
area to construct well pad sites. 82 Although horizontal well pads
are four to five times larger in size compared to vertical wells, this
difference in surface disturbance cannot be linked to the enormous
variation of surface disturbance between underground mining and
strip mining. 83 Additionally, a large tract such as the one at issue
in Strong would actually endure less surface damage if developed
through horizontal drilling instead of vertical drilling. 84 Because
vertical drilling can only target pockets of gas, to develop a large
tract multiple well pad sites would be necessary to adequately
extract all the minerals. 85 However, through horizontal drilling all
the underlying gas on a large tract could be targeted through the
implementation of only one well pad. 86 At best, one could argue
there are some tracts of land that are small enough that the
parties did not contemplate this type of surface disturbance that
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing require, but this is not
likely to be an issue because a tract that small would likely not be
sufficient to get a drilling permit. For these reasons, the surface
use analysis connecting strip mining to horizontal drilling was
flawed.
The only reasonable connection between strip mining and
horizontal drilling is that both methods of mineral extraction are
technological advances. This reason alone, however, is not enough
to conclude that a court following the precedent in Strong would
prohibit horizontal drilling when the deeds or leases involved were
executed before the method became common. Rather, this analysis
misguidedly emphasizes that the court ruled solely on the issue of
technological advances. 87
Such a rule would deliver absurd results counter to public
policy. For example, if a new technological breakthrough

80. McGowan, supra note 75 (noting that a horizontal well pad can extract
natural gas from hundreds more surrounding acres as a vertical well pad).
81. See id.
82. FERSHEE , supra note 18, at 121.
83. McGowan, supra note 75.
84. Multiple Horizontal Wells, supra note 29.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Proctor, supra note 42, at 502–03.
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permitted the mining of coal to be performed by microscopic
transportation resulting in no surface damage, the method would
be disallowed on lands with dated leases solely on the grounds for
being a technological advance. This result would be illogical and
counter to the interests of the surface owners because the new
technology would actually cause less damage to the surface than
previous methods. 88 Under the unforeseen technology rationale, a
1904 deed would not allow coal mining using mechanized drilling
equipment instead of people because the technology was simply
not conceivable at the time the deed was entered. This is clearly
erroneous.
Furthermore, horizontal drilling, writ large, actually damages
less surface area as compared to vertical drilling overall. 89 The
real point of the Strong case was less about the process used and
more about the harm reasonably contemplated to the surface.
Specifically, the court held that strip mining could not be a
reasonably necessary use under the 1904 lease terms because the
parties at the time could not have contemplated mining techniques
that would completely destroy the surface.90 As such, the
distinction the court found in Strong would not be appropriately
applied to create a blanket prohibition to horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing.
A court applying the Strong decision should still find that
horizontal drilling is, in many (if not most) cases, a reasonably
necessary use of the surface because its operations do not
completely destroy the surface. 91 Though a new extraction process
may create a larger temporary disturbance than what might have
been expected in 1904 for each well, the disturbance from
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing is often substantially
less than what might have occurred had multiple wells been
drilled on the land in 1904 because new technologies and spacing
regulations now limit surface disturbances in comparison to the
old drilling methods. 92 Thus, the “contemplation of the parties”
includes what would have been deemed a reasonable harm to the
surface when the lease was entered, 93 but does not limit the
possible extraction processes used to those processes available on
the date the deed or lease was created. The question, then, is
whether the extraction process used causes a harm to the surface

88. Multiple Horizontal Wells, supra note 29.
89. Id.
90. Strong, 42 S.E.2d at 49.
91. Id.
92. See McGowan, supra note 75 (noting that “[o]ne vertical well on a
single pad can ‘drain’ natural gas from, say, 10 to 80 acres. But a heftier pad
with numerous vertical wells to accommodate far-reaching horizontal drilling
technology can pull in gas from 500 to 1,000 acres.”).
93. Strong, 42 S.E.2d at 49.
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that was reasonably contemplated or whether the harm to the
surface is unreasonable based on the contemplation of the parties.
2.

Lowe v. Guyan Eagle Coals, Inc.

Another West Virginia case involving the issue of whether a
new technology or method overburdened a surface estate is the
Lowe case. 94 Like the Strong case, the main issue before the court
in Lowe was whether, at the time of severing the mineral estate in
1902, the parties involved contemplated a boundless right of
way. 95 The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
coal company who sought a right of way over the surface for uses
of transporting equipment and employees to and from a strip
mine. 96 The trial court held that because the mineral owner had
used a right of way to transport coal from the previous deep mine
across the surface for a number of years, the mineral owner was
entitled to continued access even for strip mining activities. 97
On appeal, the state supreme court overturned the grant of
summary judgment on the grounds that the trial court had
committed error by not conducting an evidentiary hearing. 98
Specifically, the court stated an evidentiary hearing should have
been held to determine whether the mineral owner’s use of the
surface to transport coal was a reasonable use of the surface
property. 99 The court remanded the case back to the trial court so
that a jury could determine if the modern method of hauling strip
mined coal was substantially different from what was
contemplated in 1902 by the parties. 100 Additionally, the Supreme
Court noted that the jury was permitted to assess damages for
unauthorized use if it was determined that the coal company’s
access over burdened the surface owner’s estate. 101
A dramatic statement from Lowe is found in Syllabus Point
Two, which states that “[n]o use may be made of a right-of-way
different from that established at the time of its creation so as to
burden the servient estate to a greater extent than was
contemplated at the time of the grant.”102 Thus, the key factor for
determining whether an intended use is reasonably necessary is
whether the operation burdens the surface estate more than was

94. Lowe v. Guyan Eagle Coals, Inc., 273 S.E.2d 91, 92 (W. Va. 1980).
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 93.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Lowe, 273 S.E.2d at 91.
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originally contemplated by the parties. 103 If the intended use
substantially over burdens the property more than originally
contemplated, the intended surface use is not reasonably
necessary.104 On the other hand, if the intended use is within the
scope of burden that could have been expected at the time of
contemplation, such surface use would be reasonably necessary. 105
To some, this may appear to apply to operations related to
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing operations. However,
such an assumption would be incorrect. This rule of law does not
mean that the exact process used at the time the deed was created
must be used. Nor does it mean that the exact same surface
disturbance is all that is permissible. Instead, it means that future
mineral extractions cannot create significantly different burdens
than the ones that could have been expected when deed was
created.
As previously discussed, horizontal drilling operations more
often than not require less surface area to develop minerals as
compared to vertical drilling operations. 106 Because of this,
horizontal drilling operations will not overburden surface owners’
estate more than vertical drilling, and thus such operations fall
within the scope of burden of even old leases and severances. 107
Therefore, horizontal drilling operations are, in most cases, a
reasonably necessary use of the surface.

B. The Reasonably Necessary Approach to a Mineral
Owner’s Implied Easement of Surface Use
Implicit in the mineral owner developing minerals is the right
of access to the surface. 108 The mineral owner possesses a right of
implied easement to access the surface and when necessary to
perform operations in support of developing the underlying
mineral estate. 109 Such access generally entitles the mineral owner
to occupy as much surface area as reasonably necessary to develop
his estate. 110 However, the mineral owner’s utilization of the

103. See id. (stating, “[N]o use may be made of a right-of-way, different
from that established at the time of its creation so as to burden the servient
estate to a greater extent than was contemplated at the time of the grant .”)
(emphasis added).
104. See id. at 93.
105. See id.
106. FERSHEE , supra note 18, at 121.
107. Multiple Horizontal Wells, supra note 29.
108. Dawkins et al., supra note 5, at 596.
109. FERSHEE , supra note 18, at 79.
110. See id. (explaining that mineral rights are dominant to the surface
estate and are granted “reasonable use of the surface and subsurface to access
the minerals.”).
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surface owner’s land does have limitations. The United States
Supreme Court, recognized this limitation on implied access when
it held a mineral owner could use as much of the surface as
reasonably necessary for the operations of removing, mining, and
prospecting minerals. 111 As a general matter horizontal drilling
operations would fall into the specific categories recognized by the
United States Supreme Court. Along with fitting into the
categories listed, horizontal drilling is a reasonably necessary use
of the surface because it is the only feasible way to develop gas
(i.e., access minerals) in the Marcellus Shale region.
1.

Coffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Co.

An early case in West Virginia, involving a conflict between a
surface owner and gas developer is outlined in Coffindaffer. 112 The
court faced the question of whether a gas company had the right to
build a roadway across a surface owner’s land even though the
lease signed by the mineral owner granted only the right “to bore
and develop said land for oil and gas, with the necessary usual and
convenient rights for said oil and gas development.”113 The
roadway at issue was essential for the gas company in
transmitting materials to the drilling location. 114 Without the
materials, the drilling operations could not begin at the drill
site. 115 Despite the need for a roadway to conduct drilling
operations, the surface owner maintained that the gas company
lacked the necessary rights to construct the road. 116
The court held that the gas company had the right to build a
roadway across the surface because such actions were needed to
develop gas as described in the lease. 117 In doing so, the court
created a rule establishing that injury necessarily inflicted by a
mineral owner in the exercise of a lawful right does not constitute
liability to the surface owner. 118 The court reasoned, “[t]he injury
must be the direct result of the commission of a wrong,” “if the
defendant did no wrong, it is not liable, notwithstanding the
injury.”119 However, a key fact in the Coffindaffer case was that
the drill site was abandoned after the road way was built. 120 For
this reason, the court stated in Syllabus Point Two that “[b]ut if,

111. Kinney-Coastal Oil Co. v. Kieffer, 277 U.S. 488, 504 (1927).
112. Coffindaffer, 81 S.E. 966.
113. Id. at 966.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 967.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
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after building the road, he abandons the contemplated exploration
for oil and gas, before drilling a well, he is liable for injury to the
land, caused by the building of the road, notwithstanding the
landowner has no interest in the oil and gas under his land.”121
The decision focused its analysis on the reasonably necessary
approach to surface use. 122 The court’s analysis hinged on the gas
company’s convenience and necessity rather than the surface
owner’s rights. 123
The court noted that if the gas company had completed its
operations, or even drilled one hole in prospect of exploration, the
surface owner would not have been entitled to recover damages. 124
This is because, when executed in good faith, the damages
incurred on the surface would have been within the constructs of
the gas lease. 125 If a mineral owner or gas company uses the
surface in a manner that is for the purpose of developing minerals
(whether or not that attempt is successful), liability for surface
injury would not be proper. 126 However, if surface damage results
from actions not associated with the attempted development of
minerals, a gas company becomes liable for those surface
damages. 127
This model of surface damage liability is directly related to
the issue of horizontal drilling operations. If horizontal drilling is
exercised by a mineral owner properly for the development of
minerals and damage to the surface occurs, such damage does not
create liability for this good faith attempt at mineral
development. 128 Coffindaffer, as applied to horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing, supports a finding that when exercised
diligently, the processes are a reasonably necessary use of the
surface.
2.

Adkins v. United Fuel Gas

In determining whether horizontal drilling operations are a
reasonably necessary surface use, it is also important to assess
surface owner complaints of trespass involving drilling operations.
West Virginia law provides that once an operator or mineral owner
goes beyond the scope of reasonably necessary actions on the
surface a trespass claim may be valid. The Adkins v. United Fuel

121. Coffindaffer v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 81 S.E. 966, 966 (1914).
122. Id. at 967.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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Gas case dealt specifically with drilling operations conflicting with
a surface owner’s right to farm. 129 In Adkins, a surface owner
brought a trespass claim against the mineral owner for damages to
the surface caused by drilling operations. 130 The gas company had
drilled a well in the center of a fifty-acre tract that the surface
owner used to grow row crops.131 Along with the drilling operations
conducted on the surface, the gas company also constructed
roadways and dug ditches to lay pipelines. 132
After the drilling was completed and other operations ceased,
the subject surface area was left unsustainable to grow crops. 133
The surface owner maintained that he was entitled to damages for
loss of his crops, which resulted from the deprivation of his garden,
alfalfa field, and standing corn crop. 134 The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia agreed that the surface owner had
sustained concrete injuries, but because the gas company had
caused the injuries to the surface by my means of extracting,
producing, and transporting the underlying minerals in a manner
that was reasonably necessary, the court ultimately ruled in favor
of the gas company. 135
The precedent in Adkins suggests that horizontal drilling is a
reasonably necessary use. Specifically, because horizontal drilling
is the only means by which a mineral owner can economically
extract and produce gas within the Marcellus Shale region, such
operations on the surface must be reasonably necessary. In
addition, because any injuries caused to the surface during
horizontal drilling results from the extraction and production of
gas, such surface use is reasonably necessary. Horizontal drilling
operations will disturb the surface, at least to some degree, but
these disturbances are inherent in the process of developing
minerals.
3.

Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin

Turing to the West Virginia court’s application of the
reasonably necessary approach, it is important to focus on the
implications of what operations are permissible on the surface. A
case directly on point is Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin.136 In that
case, there was a severed estate involving a dispute over surface

129. Adkins v. United Fuel Gas Co., 61 S.E.2d 633, 634 (W. Va. 1950).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Buffalo Mining Co. v. Martin, 267 S.E.2d 721 (W. Va. 1980).
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use. 137 The Martin family owned the surface rights to the subject
land and Buffalo Mining Company had acquired the mineral
rights beneath. 138 Ultimately, Buffalo Mining Company sought an
injunction against the Martin family to prevent the family from
obstructing the company’s intended operations. 139 The Martin
family did not want the company to construct an electric
transmission line on the surface of their land. 140 The company
stressed that without constructing the electric lines, the company
would not be able to ventilate the coalmine. 141 As such, the
proposed construction of the electric lines was absolutely
necessary for the company to mine the coal. 142 Eventually, the
court ruled in favor of the coal company, affirming the trial court’s
grant of injunction, but not without examining the reasonably
necessary approach in detail. 143
The overall implications of the Buffalo Mining decision
support a rule that a mineral owner must show that operations on
the surface are reasonably necessary for the extraction of minerals
and that the actions sought do not substantially over burden the
surface. 144 In conducting its analysis of the reasonably necessary
approach, the court distinguished two types of conflicts that occur
between surface owners and mineral owners. 145 The first type of
conflict arises where the mineral owner’s activity has disturbed
the surface negatively, but not completely. 146 The second type of
conflict involves mineral owner actions that either destroy the
surface or entails operations that are totally incompatible with the
rights of the surface owner. 147 In doing so, the court recognized
that surface uses that fall into the second category are generally
not a reasonable and necessary use of the surface because such
operations substantially over burden the surface. 148
Following this reasoning, it would appear that horizontal
drilling would not fall in the second category listed in Buffalo
Mining. Specifically, horizontal drilling operations do not destroy

137. Id. at 722.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 726.
144. Id. at 725.
145. Id.
146. See id. at 724 (stating, “[t]he issue here presented involves no claim of
any widespread destruction of the surface, but whether the utilization of the
surface . . . can be inferred as a reasonable use within the context of the
severance deed language.”).
147. See id. at 725 (citing Strong, 42 S.E.2d 46).
148. See id. (noting that “a right to surface use will not be implied where it
is totally incompatible with the rights of the surface owner.”).
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the surface and are usually not completely incompatible with the
rights of surface owners. Although there are certain circumstances
where horizontal drilling operations would be contrary to a surface
owner’s rights, these situations are limited and do not satisfy a
strict finding of incompatibility. As such, the common law applying
the reasonably necessary approach in West Virginia supports the
implementation of horizontal drilling in most circumstances.
4.

Crowder v. EQT Production Co.

A recent trial court case in Doddridge County, West Virginia,
is consistent with this reasoning. 149 In Crowder v. EQT Production
Co., two surface owners did “not dispute that the owner of the
mineral tract underlying their property ha[d] the implied right to
‘reasonable use’ of their surface lands for well pads, roads, and
pipelines to drill into, and produce gas from, but only from, the
mineral tract underlying their surface lands.” 150 Instead, the
surface owners sued the oil and gas production company (EQT) for
trespass for conducting horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing and related activities on their land for the purpose of
extracting oil and gas from adjacent properties. 151 The court
agreed, explaining that because “no such right [to use the
plaintiffs’ surface to drill neighboring tracts] was ever obtained, no

149. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Crowder v. EQT Prod.
Co., Civil Action No. 14-C-64, Circuit Court of Doddridge County, West
Virginia (Feb. 19, 2016) (on file with author). This case has certified the
following question to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals:
Where neither the mineral owner nor the mineral owner's lessees or
agents have an express agreement from the surface owners (or their
predecessors) by deed, lease, or other document to explore for and
produce oil or gas from neighboring mineral tracts, is there any implied
or other right to use a tract of surface land in order to explore for and
produce minerals from neighboring mineral tracts that do not underlie
the surface tract (other than by the natural migration of oil or gas to
well bores drilled from the surface tract into its underlying mineral
tract pursuant to the rule of capture)?
Order Certifying Question of Law, Crowder v. EQT Prod. Co., Civil Action
No. 14-C-64, Circuit Court of Doddridge County, West Virginia (Feb. 19, 2016)
(on file with author). The Supreme Court of West Virginia, though, declined to
docket the certified question. Sup. Ct. of W.V., Decisions, Notes, and Orders,
Apr.
26,
2016,
at
2,
www.courtswv.gov/supreme-court/orderlists/spring2016/April-29-2016.pdf.
150. Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Summary Judgment and
Denying Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Crowder v. EQT Prod.
Co., ¶ 11.
151. Id. at ¶¶ 6, 13.
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further inquiry regarding reasonable use is necessary.” 152 In a
footnote, the court went on to explain that even if there were an
implied right, that right could “only be exercised where there was
no substantial burden on the surface owner.”153
The court is accurate in this assessment, and it is worth
nothing that the “substantial burden” of hydraulic fracturing and
horizontal drilling must be assessed based on the additional
burden the surface owners experience because of the activities
from extracting from the adjacent properties, not the total
burden. 154 The court determined that “EQT’s drilling activities
constitute a cognizable, material, additional servitude on
Plaintiffs’ surface lands.”155 In this case, EQT admitted “that
62.5% of the nine horizontal well bores are outside the [relevant]
Lease, while 32.5% are within the boundary of the [relevant] Lease
that underlies Plaintiffs’ surface lands.”156 Thus, a major portion of
the oil and gas was being extracted from other plats of land, even
though the 100% of the surface burden was borne by the
plaintiffs. 157 This case, while reluctant to extend reasonable use to
extraction from adjacent land, reinforces that horizontal drilling
and hydraulic fracturing can be (and are probably presumptively)
reasonably necessary to extract oil and gas where the right to
extract oil and gas otherwise exists.

C. West Virginia’s Legislative Reaction to Conflicts
Involving Surface Use
The West Virginia legislature was one of the first states in the
Union to consider passing a law that would ensure citizens can
recover damages caused by mineral development. 158 In 1983, the
legislature passed the state’s first surface owners’ damages law
called the West Virginia Oil and Gas Production Damage
Compensation Act. 159 Another act passed by the legislature
intended to ease the tensions between surface use and mineral
development was the Oil and Gas Wells Act enacted in 1994. 160

152. Id. at ¶ 22.
153. Id. at ¶ 22 n.4.
154. See id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at ¶ 12.
157. Id.
158. See Clifford B. Levine & Shawn N. Gallagher, State and Local
Regulation of Oil and Gas Operations: Drilling Through the Maze of
Preemption, Severed Mineral Estates and Surface Owner Rights, 29 Energy &
Min. L. Inst. 11, at 364 & nn. 83 & 84 (2008), www.emlf.org/clientuploads/
directory/whitepaper/Levine_08.pdf (citing similar statutes).
159. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-7-1 (West 2015).
160. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6-1.
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More recently, the West Virginia legislature has been proactive in
enacting additional statutory measures to ensure surface owners
would be protected from damages caused by oil and gas operations,
emphasizing the issues of surface use and horizontal drilling. In
doing so, the legislature passed the Horizontal Well Production
Compensation Act, which is intended to regulate and control
horizontal drilling operations. 161
1.

West Virginia Oil and Gas Production Damage
Compensation Act

The West Virginia Oil and Gas Production Damage
Compensation Act or “Compensation Act” as detailed by the
legislature was passed “to provide constitutionally permissible
protection and compensation to surface owners of lands on which
oil and gas wells are drilled from the burden resulting from
drilling operations commenced after [June 9, 1983].”162 The
legislature noted that the new modern methods of mineral
extraction require more surface use than the methods commonly
in used at the time that most mineral estates were either created
or leased. 163 Additionally, the Compensation Act details that the
language of the statute shall be interpreted for the benefit of
surface owners notwithstanding whether the mineral estate at
issue was separated from the surface estate. 164 Further, the
statute shall be applied for the benefit of surface owners
regardless of which estate entity signed the oil and gas lease for
developing the minerals. 165
Although the Compensation Act might have not initially
contemplated the issues directly involving horizontal drilling
practices, the statute nonetheless provides an ample structure to
ensure surface owners can recover damages caused by drilling
operations. The statute enables surface owners to recover damages
up to two years past the date that the gas developer filed the
notice of reclamation operations beginning. 166 To recover such
damages, the surface owner must simply notify the gas developer
of the damage amount requested and the gas developer must
respond within sixty days by either making an offer or rejecting

161. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-2.
162. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-7-1(d).
163. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-7-1(a)(2).
164. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-7-1(d).
165. Id.
166. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-7-5 (stating that “[a]ny surface owner, to
receive compensation under section three of this article, shall notify the oil
and gas developer of the damages sustained by the person within two years
after the date that the oil and gas developer files notice that reclamation is
commencing under section thirty, article six of this chapter.”).
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the surface owner’s claim. 167 If the gas developer timely responds
with a counteroffer, the surface owner may also elect to reject or
accept the offer. 168 Section 3 of the Compensation Act, details what
damages and expenses a gas developer is obligated to pay the
surface owner for
(1) Lost income or expenses incurred as a result of being unable
to dedicate land actually occupied by the driller’s operation or to
which access is prevented by such drilling operation to the uses to
which it was dedicated prior to commencement of the activity for
which a permit was obtained or measured from the date the
operator entered upon the land until the date reclamation is
completed;
(2) the market value of crops destroyed, damaged, or prevented
from reaching market;
(3) any damage to water supply in use prior to the
commencement of the permitted activity;
(4) the cost to repair personal property up to the value of
replacement by personal property of like age, wear and quality; and
(5) the diminution in value, if any, of the surface lands and
other property after completion of the surface disturbance done
pursuant to the activity for which the permit was issued determined
according to the actual use made thereof by the surface owner
immediately prior to the commencement of the permitted activity.169

Ultimately, the total compensation to be paid must be agreed
to by both parties involved. Additionally, the formula for
calculating the associated damages must be approved by both
parties. 170 As is apparent in the above section, the Compensation
Act’s broad text covers a large number of differing types of surface
claims that could result from oil and gas operations. Although the
act does allow surface owners to recover compensation for property
damages without filing claims in court, a surface owner is not
precluded from filing a suit. 171 Additionally, if the conflict is not
settled within the sixty-day window, Section 7 of the act
authorizes a surface owner to either file a suit seeking damages or
seek compensation by way of arbitration. 172 Ultimately, the
statutory scheme of the Compensation Act supports the
development of minerals by horizontal drilling. On its face, the
statute not only acknowledges that natural gas drilling operations

167. W. Va. Code
168. Id.
169. W. Va. Code
170. Id at § (a).
171. W. Va. Code
172. W. Va. Code

Ann. § 22-7-6.
Ann. §§ 22-7-3(a)(1)–(5).
Ann. § 22-7-4(a).
Ann. § 22-7-7(a).
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cause surface use problems, but also seeks to mitigate the conflicts
through a statutory scheme.
2.

Oil and Gas Wells Act

The Oil and Gas Wells Act was enacted in 1994 and, like the
Compensation Act, it mainly regulated vertical drilling
operations. 173 The Oil and Gas Wells Act simply lacked the teeth
or the governing regulations to cover horizontal drilling
operations. The statute was designed for the regulation of small
vertical drilling operations and not intended to deal with
overarching industry of horizontal drilling.
Horizontal drilling operations in West Virginia did not wait
for a new law, and production of natural gas using the drilling
process began in 2007. 174 Specifically, production accelerated
dramatically from 0.2 million thousand cubic MCF in 2007 to 142
million MCF in 2011. 175 Early on, it was apparent that the
regulations setup by the statute could not sufficiently govern
horizontal drilling operations. For example, the statute, as
written, lacked any regulations concerning hydraulic fracturing (or
fracking), 176 the main drilling completion technique that makes
horizontal drilling viable. 177 Responding to concerns from citizens,
the West Virginia legislature tackled the issues surrounding
horizontal drilling and passed the Natural Gas Horizontal Well
Act discussed below.
3.

Natural Gas Horizontal Well Act

On December 14, 2011, the West Virginia legislature passed a
statute directly aimed at regulating horizontal drilling operations
within the Marcellus Shale region. 178 The Natural Gas Horizontal
Well Act or “Horizontal Well Act” applies specifically to wells
drilled by the use of horizontal drilling. 179 Like the previous

173. See W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6-1 (mentioning the word “horizontal” only
once throughout the entire act.).
174. Which County Leads WV’s Marcellus Production, THE STATE
JOURNAL,
www.statejournal.com/story/19853093/which-county-leads-wvsmarcellus-production (last updated Nov. 17, 2012).
175. Id.
176. Cf. Vinson & Elkins, Shale & Fracking Tracker: West Virginia,
http://fracking.velaw.com/west-virginia-hydraulic-fracturing-profile/
(last
updated Mar. 2015) (stating that the Natural Gas Horizontal Well Control Act
“establishes a permitting process for horizontal wells, requires additional
studies, and authorizes WVDEP to adopt new rules.”).
177. Tieman & Vann, supra note 3, at 1–2.
178. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-2.
179. Id.
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discussed statutes, the Horizontal Well Act purpose is designed (at
least in part) to benefit surface owners, regardless of whether the
property rights involve a severed estate or lease executed by a
mineral owner. 180 The Horizontal Well Act offers greater
protections to surface owners than the previous statutes.
Specifically, Section § 22-6B-1(b) of the Horizontal Well Act
prohibits a surface owner from waiving compensation or damages
by any provision in a lease, deed, or other document entered into
after December 31, 2011. 181 This statutory provision protects
surface owners from inadvertently waiving any possible property
damages before drilling operations begin. By safeguarding surface
owners from waiving damages, the statute not only ensures
property damage claims will not be barred, but also prohibits
unfair contract relations from industry representatives.
Along with providing a means for surface owners to recover
property damages, the Horizontal Well Act also features provisions
that inhibit surface conflicts from occurring. For example, the
statute prohibits wells from being drilled within two hundred fifty
feet of an existing water source intended for human or livestock
consumption. 182 Another provision of the statute sets limits on how
close horizontal drilling operations can occur in location of a house
or barn. 183 Specifically, the statute mandates that a distance of six
hundred twenty-five feet should exist between the center of a well
pad and an occupied dwelling structure or a shelter used for
livestock. 184 By setting these limitations on horizontal drilling
operations the statute seeks to protect surface owners from
adverse conditions of not only water contamination but general
nuisances as well. It is worth noting here that there are significant
questions as to whether these acts have reached the stated goal of
protecting surface owners sufficiently.
As for permitting horizontal drilling operations, the
Horizontal Well Act entails an all-encompassing permitting
process with the West Virginia Department of Environmental
Protection or “DEP.”185 Before filing for a permit with the DEP, a
gas operator must first conduct surveys and inspections on the
designated surface area. 186 Additionally, the statute mandates
that the gas operator must notify the surface owner of such
intended activities at least seven days, but no more than 45 days

180. § 22-6B-1(c).
181. W. Va. Code Ann. §
182. W. Va. Code Ann. §
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. W. Va. Code Ann. §
186. W. Va. Code Ann. §

22-6B-1(b).
22-6A-12(a).
22-6A-7(a).
22-6A-10(a).
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prior to entering the surface owners land. 187 Further, the gas
operator must inform any surface owner that has a water well,
spring, or other water source located within one thousand five
hundred feet of the center of the intended well pad site. 188
Included in the notice sent to all surface owners, should be a copy
of the erosion and sediment control plan. Along with a copy of the
erosion and sediment control plan sent, should be information
detailing that the surface owner can contact the DEP to receive a
copy of statutes and regulations governing gas operations. 189 All of
the
above
requirements
mandate
communication
and
transparency between gas developers and surface owners. Because
communication and transparency occur way before drilling
operations begin, surface owners are given the opportunity to
assert grievances and criticisms before such operations escalate to
conflicts.
The Horizontal Well Act commands an elaborated erosion and
sediment
control
plan. 190
Specifically,
the
statute
has
requirements pertaining to the methods of stabilization, drainage
systems, and the types of reclamation that are allowable. 191
Additionally, submitted permits can be denied for numerous
reasons, up to and including insufficiencies in reclamation
plans. 192
The permitting requirements are significant, and at least in
part, support surface owner protection. The mission of the erosion
and sediment control plan, for example, is to return disturbed
surface areas back to their original state by methods of grading,
seeding and planting. 193 As a whole, the Horizontal Well Act seeks
to proactively protect surface owners from damages that could be
caused by horizontal drilling operations and simultaneously these
rules place limits on surface owner recovery. In doing so, the
statute acknowledges that horizontal drilling operations will occur
in the Marcellus Shale region and advocates a system to handle
conflicts of surface use.
Under both statute and common law, horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing is a reasonably necessary use of the surface.
First, the Marcellus Shale could never be economically developed
without the implementation of horizontal drilling and hydraulic
fracturing, and existing case law, along with statutory
enactments, support horizontal drilling. As detailed above, the

187. Id.
188. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-10(b)(5).
189. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-10(j)(3).
190. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-7(c).
191. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-7(c)(1).
192. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-7(b)(15).
193. See generally Skousen & Ziemkiewicz, supra note 77.
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West Virginia courts have continuously granted a great deal of
deference to the mineral estate owner in developing underlying
minerals. Additionally, the courts have made it clear that they will
not rule in favor of a trespass claim for a surface owner unless the
mineral owner is unreasonably acting outside the limitations
expressed in a deed. Further, the courts have repeatedly held that
a surface owner may only prevail when there is substantial
damage that can be proven with a high degree certainty by
demonstrable evidence. As such, the court system has placed a
substantial burden on surface owners seeking damages caused by
the development of underlying mineral rights, thus establishing a
clear finding that when horizontal drilling operations are
conducted appropriately, such operations are a reasonably
necessary use of the surface.
The West Virginia legislature has supported a finding that
horizontal drilling is a reasonably necessary use of the surface by
the issuance of legislation intended to solve conflicts between
surface owners and natural gas developers. Specifically, the
legislation targeted problems involving horizontal drilling in a
manner that was practical in addressing surface owner concerns.
As such, in passing legislation intended to mitigate problems
caused by horizontal drilling, the legislature was acknowledging
and approving that horizontal drilling would occur in the
Marcellus Shale region. The mere titles of the statutes passed
support a finding that horizontal drilling operations are a
reasonably necessary use of the surface.
Specifically, the Compensation Act, the Horizontal Well
Compensation Act, and the Horizontal Well Act all were passed on
the basis of providing benefits to surface owners in matters of
horizontal drilling. The Horizontal Well Compensation Act and the
Compensation Act provides an explicit means through which
surface owners can recover compensation for property damages
without filing claims in court. The statutes suggest to the courts
that horizontal drilling is a reasonably necessary use even in
decades old mineral leases or severed estates. 194 Overall, West
Virginia statutes support the implementation of horizontal drilling
to develop mineral rights within the Marcellus Shale region.

III. WHO OWNS WHAT?
Another significant challenge in the Marcellus Shale has been
how to assess deeds and leases to determine who has a right to
what. One recurring issue is the question of whether an interest
holder has mineral rights or just royalty rights. Although parties

194. W. Va. Code Ann. § 22-6A-2.
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often, of course, try to solve such problems through negotiation
and settlement, litigation has become rather common.

A. Mineral Rights and Royalty Rights
The issues usually turn on the language of the reservation
clause and granting clause. When someone has mineral rights,
that person holds the rights to oil and gas in place. 195 This right
contains executive rights, which includes the operating rights to
explore and produce oil and gas. 196 A holder of the mineral rights
also has the power to lease the executive rights of exploration and
production to another party. In contrast, the holder of a royalty
interest only has a right in the oil and gas if and when that oil and
gas is produced by the owner of the mineral rights (thus, having no
rights to lease).
Traditionally, the term royalty means “a lessor’s share of the
oil produced under a lease.”197 It has also been said that a royalty
interest gives the holder “a share of production, if, as and when
there is production, free of the cost of production.”198 “The concept
of royalty always presupposes development or production of the
mineral to which it relates.”199 Following is an example of a royalty
clause:
Should a well be found for producing gas only, the full consideration
to Lessor for such gas well and its products shall be a rental
[royalty] payable within 30 days after the expiration of each quarter
beginning with the date when gas is marketed therefrom and
continuing so long as gas is produced and marketed or used off the
premises, equal to one-eighth (1/8) of the proceeds received by the
Lessee . . . .200

In contrast, a mineral interest gives the holder the “right to
enter the land to explore, drill, produce, and otherwise carry on
mining activities.”201 The holder of the mineral interest also has
the option to lease his or her operational right to explore, drill, and
produce the mineral. 202 This right to engage in operations or to

195. See Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77, 80–82 (W. Va. 1963) (citing
cases noting that an interest in royalties, rentals, and income from minerals
within a tract of land amounts to an interest in the minerals located in that
tract of land.).
196. See id.
197. ROBERT T. DONLEY, THE LAW OF COAL, O IL AND G AS IN WEST
VIRGINIA AND VIRGINIA § 162a (1951) [Hereinafter DONLEY, 1951].
198. PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE K. K RAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS :
MANUAL OF O IL AND G AS TERMS 922 (15th ed.).
199. McIntosh v. Vail, 28 S.E.2d 95, 97 (W. Va. 1943).
200. DONLEY, 1951, supra note 197, at § 159a.
201. Martin & Kramer, supra note 198, at 606–07.
202. See id. at 607.
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lease that operational right is called the “executive right.” 203 An
example of language creating a mineral interest might be as
follows:
Grantor hereby reserves unto itself, its successors and assigns, any
and all of the oil and gas and their constituents, sulfur, coal, lignite,
uranium, and other fissionable material, geothermal energy, base
and precious metals, rock, stone, gravel, and any other mineral
substances presently in or under the [subject] premises described
. . . .204

The case of Davis v. Hardman articulates the difference
between a “royalty interest” and “an interest in oil and gas in
place,” the latter of which is, again, often known as a mineral
interest.205 In Davis, the court stated that the “distinguishing
characteristics” of a royalty interest are:
‘(1) Such share of production is not chargeable with any of the costs
of discovery and production; (2) the owner has no right to do any act
or thing to discover and produce the oil and gas; (3) the owner has
no right to grant leases; and (4) the owner has no right to receive
bonuses or delay rentals.’206

In contrast, the court explained,
‘the distinguishing characteristics of an interest in minerals in place
are: (1) Such interest is not free of costs of discovery and production;
(2) the owner has the right to do any and all acts necessary to
discover and produce oil and gas; (3) the owner has the right to
grant leases, and (4) the owner has the right to receive bonuses and
delay rentals.’207

The term “royalty” has, however, also been used in West
Virginia to describe a “grant, or exception, of title to the oil in
place.”208 Where terms in the deed may be confusing, a court will
look to the intent of the parties from the entire deed. It does not
matter whether certain words are used, “the intent being the

203. See Robert T. Donley, Development of the Law of Coal, Oil and Gas
From 1951 to 1971, 74 W. VA. L. REV . 260, 276–77 (1972) [hereinafter Donley,
1972] (discussing Davis v. Hardman, 133 S.E.2d 77 (W. Va. 1963)).
204. Ohio Dep’t of Transportation, Office of Real Estate, Forms, Mineral
Rights Reservation Clause, www.dot.state.oh.us/Divisions/Engineering/Real
Estate/Real%20Estate%20Forms/RE%2074-40-MR%20Mineral%20Rights%20
Reservation%20Clause.docx (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
205. Davis, 133 S.E.2d at 81; see also Stan Ingram & Travis Connor,
Mineral vs. Royalty Distinction, 26 (June 15, 2012), www.landman.org/docs/
educational-material-(pdf)/mineral-v-royalty-aapl-paper.pdf (stating that a
mineral interest is also known as “oil and gas in place” in West Virginia).
206. Davis, 133 S.E.2d at 81 (quoting Mounger v. Pittman, 108 So. 2d 565,
566 (Miss. 1959)).
207. Id. at 81–82 (quoting Mounger, 108 So. 2d at 566).
208. DONLEY, 1951, supra note 197, at § 228.
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matter to be considered. Nowadays we construe deeds as well as
wills by the four corners and get at the intention, no matter that
the word may not be entirely apt.”209

B. Distinguishing Mineral Rights from Royalty Rights
The problem, not surprisingly, is that deed language varies,
which can create questions as to whether a reservation clause
reserved mineral rights or merely royalty rights. The difference
between these two rights can be substantial because a mineral
rights holder with the executive rights to allow drilling can be
compensated with a “bonus payment” for the right to begin
production, as well as received royalties for the product sold. A
royalty owner, in contrast, cannot decide drilling should
commence. A royalty owner simply gets compensated if and when
production occurs.
For example, consider the following Sample Reservation
Clause from a deed that “reserves and excepts from the operation
of this deed and does not convey hereby the usual consideration of
1/8 royalty of the oil and natural gas saved and produced from
each drilled well producing oil and natural gas used and marketed
off site.” Despite using the term “royalty,” such a clause uses
language that could be used to imply both mineral rights language
and mere royalty language. Here, the clause likely created a right
only to oil and gas if and when it is produced, but it could be
argued it is a mineral right.
In determining whether a royalty interest or a mineral
interest was created, courts often look to whether the language in
the deed refers to all rights in the minerals in or under the ground
or if the reference is to the minerals after extraction. Consider a
recent summary of specific terms of construction for determining
whether a deed clause has created a royalty interest or a mineral
interest. 210 The summary’s authors note that terms such as “in, on
or under,” when used alone, typically create a mineral interest. 211
The words “produced and saved” (in the past tense) have
“consistently resulted in interpretation of a royalty interest.” 212
In our sample state of West Virginia, courts have consistently
determined the term “produced” indicates the intent to create a
royalty interest, and not a mineral interest in the oil and gas in
place. In McDonald v. Bennett, the deed at issue stated, “[T]here is
reserved and excepted from this conveyance 1/8 of all the oil and

209. Jackson v. Dulaney, 67 S.E. 795, 796 (W. Va. 1910) (quoting Preston
v. White, 50 S.E. 236, 238 (W. Va. 1905)).
210. See Ingram & Connor, supra note 205, at 3–5.
211. Id. at 3.
212. Id. at 4.
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gas in and underlying said tract of land that may be produced
therefrom, and the right of ingress and egress for the purpose of
utilizing the same . . . .”213 The court determined that the
conveyance provided a 1/8 right in the oil and gas produced, as
opposed to the oil and gas in place, and that the rights of ingress
and egress attached only to the right to retrieve the oil and gas
once it was produced. 214 The use of the term “produced” in this
instance, like the terms “drilled . . . and producing” in the deeds in
question, makes clear the right is a royalty interest, and not a
mineral interest (a right to oil and gas in place). 215
Similarly, in Davis v. Hardman, the court explained,
It is apparent from the words “when produced” that the parties were
not speaking in terms of an interest in the oil and gas then in place,
but rather of the royalty interest which would follow production of
oil or gas, or both. If the language of the . . . deeds were treated as
constituting a reservation of oil and gas in place, the words “when
produced'” would have to be regarded as meaningless surplusage.
Such a construction also would be wholly out of harmony with a
grant to the several grantees, their heirs and assigns of the right to
lease the land for oil and gas purposes and to receive the bonuses
and carrying rentals.” 216

Another West Virginia court stated that a deed reserving the
“usual royalty of one-eighth of all the petroleum or oil in and
underlying the tract of land hereby conveyed” might not have been
deemed an interest in oil and gas in place had the term “when
produced” been used. 217 It is worth noting that, in Harris, the
reservation is even stronger than the Reservation Clause at issue
because the deed in Harris reserved a right in “all of the
petroleum or oil underlying” the land, yet the court still indicated
that “when produced” may have eliminated the right to oil and gas
in place. 218
The Sample Reservation Clause states that grantor “reserves
and except from the operation of this deed and do not convey
hereby . . . the consideration for gas for each gas well drilled on
said land and producing gas and used and marketed off premises

213. McDonald v. Bennett, 164 S.E. 298, 299 (W. Va. 1932).
214. Id.; see also DONLEY, 1951, supra note 197, at 228.
215. McDonald, 164 S.E. at 299.
216. Davis, 133 S.E.2d at 91; see also Donley, 1972, supra note 203, at 276–
77 (referring to Davis v. Hardman as “perhaps the most important oil and gas
case decided in the Virginias in the last twenty years.”).
217. Harris v. Cobb, 38 S.E. 559, 560–61 (W. Va. 1901) overruled on other
grounds by Paxton v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 94 S.E. 472, 475 (W. Va. 1917)
(“It might have been different if the reservation had been expressed, as
appellants would have it,-that she ‘reserved a one-half of the usual royalty of
one-eighth of said oil when produced.’”).
218. Id. (emphasis added).
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. . . .”219 The use of the term “producing” here indicates an interest
in the gas after extraction (i.e., the well is “drilled . . . and
producing” before the reservation is effective). Similarly,
“marketed off site” indicates a subsequent attempted sale of the
gas off the premises. The terms in the clause do not create an
interest in the oil or gas in place (meaning the oil or gas where it
sits in the ground). 220
Similarly, in McIntosh v. Vail, the court considered a deed
clause, which, after a reservation of “all oil and gas” to the grantor,
stated “[b]ut, in event of oil or gas being developed on said land,
said [grantee] or his assigns shall be entitled to one full sixteenth
of all oil marketed and one half of the next proceeds from all gas
sold from said land.”221 The court determined that “[t]he oil and
gas right thus conferred upon the grantee takes the familiar form
of a royalty, with which the courts and people of this State have
been familiar for half a century.”222 The court further noted, “[g]as
as having been developed on the premises,” the grantee was thus
“entitled to one-half the net proceeds of all of that mineral sold
. . . .”223 Although McIntosh did not determine whether the grantee
had legal title to or merely an equitable right to “the oil and gas
interest mentioned,” the case notably does not suggest the grantee
had any operational rights (e.g., a right to drill or lease) to the
minerals in question. 224 Instead, the grantee took an interest in
the minerals that had “been developed on the premises.”225 This
language, is thus consistent with a royalty interest and not a
mineral interest.
Further evidence that the term “produced” relates to a royalty
interest can be gleaned from looking at a mineral lease between a
mineral rights holder and a lessee (as opposed to a conveyance by
deed). In a mineral lease, the mineral owner conveys his or her
rights to the oil and gas in place to the lessee, in exchange for the
right to receive royalties. 226 In Goodwin v. Wright, the court

219. Supra, Part IV.B.
220. See Davis, 133 S.E.2d at 91 (stating that the words “when produced”
mean “that the parties were not speaking in terms of an interest in the . . . gas
then in place, but rather of the royalty interest which would follow production
of . . . gas”).
221. McIntosh v. Vail, 28 S.E.2d 95, 96 (W. Va. 1943).
222. Id. at 96–97.
223. Id. at 97.
224. See id.
225. Id.
226. See FRED BOSSELMAN, ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 244 (3rd ed. 2010) (“[T]he lessor transfers the exclusive right to
develop the oil and gas to the lessee in return for a cost-free share of
production, called a royalty.”); JOHN S. LOWE , ET AL., O IL AND G AS LAW 126
(4th ed. 2002) (stating that a mineral owner conveys to an oil and gas company
the rights to explore or develop oil and gas).
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explained that “the very purpose of the [mineral rights owner] in
executing the lease is to have the oil and gas on the leased
premises produced and marketed so that he may receive his
royalty therefrom,” on the other hand, “the purpose of the lessee is
to discover and produce oil and gas in such quantities as will yield
him a profit.”227 The Sample Reservation Clause uses the similar
terms, providing that wells which are “producing oil and natural
gas used and marketed off site,” thus results in a royalty interest
and not a mineral right.

IV. CONCLUSION
Surface use disputes related to horizontal drilling and
hydraulic fracturing will continue to be an area of conflict within
the Marcellus Shale region and around the nation. As case law
evolves, it will likely continue to support the finding that
horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing are a reasonably
necessary use and the processes will continue to be used to develop
minerals in West Virginia and around the country.
Legislators and regulators may choose to add surface owner
protections and impose other measures to lessen the burden on
impacted regions to ease the conflict between surface owners and
mineral developers. Such efforts may, at times, be necessary to
ensure continued economic development in shale regions.
Communities, landowners, interest groups, companies, and
governments would be well served to work together to seek
balance and compromise in development-heavy regions. Although
courts are well-equipped to handle individual cases, large-scale
policy is better developed at the community level (state and local)
than through the adversarial system.

227. Goodwin v. Wright, 255 S.E.2d 924, 925 (W. Va. 1979) (emphasis
added) (finding that the term “produced” in an oil and gas lease means
“produced in paying quantities”).
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